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Abstract
When political journalist William D. Workman, Jr., resigned from Charleston’s News and Courier and announced plans to run for the U.S. Senate in 1962, he said it would be “unethical” to combine “objective reporting with partisan politics.” Yet Workman’s personal papers reveal that, for three years, he and editor Thomas R. Waring, Jr., had been working with Republican leaders to build a conservative party to challenge Deep South Democrats. Workman’s story provides an example of how partisan activism survived in the twentieth-century American press, despite the rise of professional standards prohibiting political engagement.

Keywords
political journalism, professionalization of journalism, partisanship

When William D. Workman, Jr., joined Charleston’s News and Courier as a young reporter in 1936, the newspaper’s editor supported political candidates and causes in news stories and opinion pieces. William Watts Ball seemed to be a throwback to the nineteenth century, when powerful editors such as Horace Greeley and Thurlow Weed used their newspapers to promote political views and ambitions. By the late 1950s, when Workman emerged as a political figure, the News and Courier’s top journalists continued to pursue political goals. However, Workman and his editor, Thomas R. Waring, Jr., presented themselves as professionals who embodied the ethical standards

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articulated by organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The two Charleston journalists proclaimed their commitment to independence and nonpartisanship in news coverage.

Workman’s struggle with such standards provides a case study of the tensions that existed between professionalization and political advocacy in twentieth-century American journalism. When Workman resigned from the News and Courier to run for the U.S. Senate in 1962, the decision may have raised eyebrows, but it did not violate the professional norms of modern journalism. The revolving door between press and politics has always existed, and the transition from one to the other, if handled transparently and with no overlap, has been an accepted practice. It has been considered unethical, however, when the journalist secretly pursues partisan political goals while claiming to maintain impartiality and independence. As Borden and Pritchard maintain, journalists have a “protected social function” of gathering, interpreting, and disseminating information, and as professionals they are expected to carry out that function without allowing partisan interests to compromise their “independent exercise of judgment.” As part of the professionalization of journalism across the twentieth century, news organizations incorporated rules governing partisanship and conflict of interest into both written and unwritten codes of ethics and standards.

During the three years prior to his 1962 campaign, however, Workman and his editor violated this code of professional journalism and used their positions at the newspaper to help build the Republican Party in South Carolina. The journalists consulted with party leaders on story ideas, helped to rewrite news releases, withheld significant political news, and developed campaign strategies to help the Republicans compete with the Democrats. Yet Workman felt the need to state when he announced his candidacy that it would be “inappropriate” and “unethical” to combine objective reporting with partisan politics. Workman’s decision to hide his political involvement indicates how problematic the issue had become for professional journalists who were tempted to engage in partisan activism.

**Literature Review**

Historians have often studied how American journalism made a transition from highly partisan in the nineteenth century to more independent and impartial in the twentieth. Some big-city newspapers became fully commercialized operations and began to perceive their readers more as consumers than voters. They regarded themselves as businesses that supplied the public with a broad range of information. In the first decades of the twentieth century, scholars have said, the professionalization of the press accelerated with the rise of journalism schools and the creation of professional associations such as the American Society of News Editors (ASNE). Nudged by critics who argued for a more responsible press, the ASNE established in 1923 its “Canons of Journalism” that maintained news reporting should be impartial and newspapers should be free of all obligations except “fidelity to the public interest.”
Historians have analyzed the implications of the professionalization of the press. Journalists, Dooley argues, were assuming the task of “a different breed of political communicator, one who, unlike politicians, would not put political ambition and partisan creed above the needs of the more general public.” Mainstream American journalism adopted what media theorists have described as the “monitorial” role in the democratic process. Journalists would provide neutral and objective reporting and allow some interpretation, but their role prohibited partisan advocacy or direct involvement in political activism. As Borden and Pritchard contend, society began to expect journalists to carry out their “essential function” as purveyors of unbiased political information without violating the public trust or concealing any conflicts of interest.

Professional standards, of course, could be widely accepted in American journalism without always being followed. Studies point out that partisan activism survived in the twentieth-century press. McChesney asserts that the professionalization of journalism merely created the appearance of neutrality to justify consolidation of the press. Kaplan argues journalists embraced the notion of impartiality to maintain public authority but found that their “apolitical ethic” failed to enhance political discourse. Dicken-Garcia maintains that journalists failed during the professionalization process to resolve clearly and definitively the issue of the proper role for the press to play in politics. The ethical rules were especially murky for editorial writers and columnists, studies show, and some opinion journalists have believed they should participate directly in politics, despite the spread of professional codes that denounced such activities. When journalists continued to engage in political activism, Schudson writes, such partisanship “could increasingly be maintained only sub rosa and in tension with norms of professionalism.” Opinion and interpretations did have acknowledged places in the press, he observes, but journalists also helped politicians behind the scenes with advice, speech writing, and other forms of support.

Historians have documented the biased coverage of the civil rights movement in white southern newspapers. Waring has been identified as being among the strongest champions of segregation during those years. In The Race Beat, Roberts and Klibanoff describe his efforts to support creation of white citizens’ councils in South Carolina and to organize segregationist newspapers in the South to pressure the Associated Press to report on racial disturbances in the North. Workman’s reporting in the 1950s has received little attention, but scholars have noted the importance of his 1962 U.S. Senate campaign. Although he lost, Workman won more votes than any previous Republican candidate in South Carolina, and his energetic campaign helped lay the foundation for the rise of the GOP in the Deep South.

This study examines Workman’s effort to straddle the line between journalism and political activism and the contradiction between his public statements and private acts. What were the personal circumstances and cultural influences that persuaded Workman and his editor to engage in partisan politics while claiming to operate as impartial journalists? Specifically, why did Workman feel free to advocate segregation, but
proclaim his neutrality and objectivity when covering partisan politics? The evidence
gathered in this study comes from Workman’s extensive personal papers, which pro-
vide a rich trove of details about his dual role as political reporter and partisan activist
during the transformation of southern politics in the 1950s and 1960s. The papers of
his editor and coverage in the News and Courier and other relevant newspapers pro-
vide additional sources.

As Shoemaker and Reese have written, forces inside and outside a news organiza-
tion can influence how journalists operate. They identify five levels of influence: soci-
etal or community norms, pressure from the audience or special interest groups,
company leadership or other organizational influences, the routines of mass media
work, and the traits of the individual workers themselves.30 As a segregationist,
Workman publicly opposed school integration in the 1950s and often ignored the pro-
fessional norms of impartial journalism when reporting on that issue.31 Because the
newspaper’s point of view on segregation aligned with the accepted norms of white
Charleston at that time, Workman and his editor declared their political advocacy
openly and proudly.32

Yet, in 1959, when Workman and Waring began their work on behalf of the
Republican Party, their advocacy conflicted with the norms of the white community.
South Carolina remained a solidly Democratic state at the time. To use Hallin’s con-
cept, support for the Republican Party fell outside the community’s “sphere of consen-
sus” and was located instead in the “sphere of legitimate controversy.”33 As a subject
of community dispute, partisan politics required impartial treatment under the norms
of modern American journalism. As a political news reporter, Workman felt com-
pelled to abide by the practices of his profession when discussing his journalistic role
in public. But as this research shows, that did not stop him from violating those expec-
tations and working behind the scenes on behalf of the Republican Party.

Partisan Journalism at the News and Courier

Both Workman and Waring had apprenticed under Ball, the paper’s editor from 1927
to 1951.34 Upon his death, the New York Times called Ball “the last of the great editor
personalities.”35 A conservative aristocrat whose career began in the 1890s, Ball
believed newspaper editors had a civic obligation to lead their communities and
engage fully in politics. The editor proudly acknowledged his partisan advocacy and
political participation.36 Waring served Ball loyally as city editor and then as manag-
ing editor. Unlike his mentor, however, Waring had spent significant time working
outside South Carolina. He graduated from the University of the South in Sewanee,
Tennessee, and spent two years at the New York Herald-Tribune, where the well-
known city editor Stanley Walker sharpened his reporting and writing skills.37 Waring
returned to Charleston in 1931 and, after taking over as editor in 1951, emerged as a
respected member of the national journalistic community. Waring served on key edi-
torial committees of both the Associated Press and the ASNE.38 Because of his segre-
gationist views, ASNE colleagues asked him to serve as cochairman of the Southern
Education Reporting Service, an organization created to supply newspapers with impartial news coverage of southern schools in the wake of the Brown v. Board of Education ruling. James Reston of the New York Times, perhaps the nation’s best-known political reporter of the era, called Waring “the most talented newspaperman in South Carolina.”

Waring took steps to modernize the News and Courier and separate news reporting from editorial opinion. In one letter to the statehouse staff in 1951, for example, he warned his political reporters to “stick to the facts” and keep their stories impartial. Waring’s rules did not apply, however, when the topic was race and civil rights. The day after the Brown decision came down in 1954, the News and Courier ran a front-page editorial that said the ruling “had cut deep into the sinews of the Republic.” Nearby, Workman’s byline appeared over a roundup of state reaction that began: “South Carolina was plunged into gloom today.”

One of Waring’s first acts as editor had been to emphasize the importance of news reporting at the state’s capital in Columbia. The Democratic Party—the only party that mattered in the South at that time—had begun to fracture over race well before the Brown case. Waring decided that Workman would be the newspaper’s “man on the scene” at the statehouse to follow the developing political story. Workman wrote conventional news stories on the subject, but also openly participated in the effort to block integration. In 1955, for example, Workman covered the work of a state segregationist group known as the Committee of 52. He also served as a consultant for the organization and took responsibility for drafting its resolution calling for South Carolina to “interpose” itself between federal law and the state’s citizens. Workman claimed he was the first to propose the use of the legal theory of interposition to halt forced integration in the South, but he acknowledged that Richmond editor James J. Kilpatrick popularized the concept.

By the late 1950s, Workman grew restless with his role as reporter. He was working on a book called The Case for the South, which defended segregation. In June 1958, he told Waring that he wanted to write a regular opinion column in the News and Courier. Workman described his reporting job as a “restricted cul-de-sac.” An opinion column, he argued, would afford him “a sense of editorial release” and allow him to make a “more useful contribution” during this critical moment in South Carolina history. Waring, however, had complained frequently about the growing editorial comment included in the news stories coming out of his Columbia bureau. He told Workman that readers paid more attention to “hot news stories” than political columns. He feared Workman’s column would look like just another “$5-a-month syndicated product.” But the editor knew Workman had other professional options and did not want to lose his top political reporter. So Waring grudgingly granted Workman a Sunday opinion column in the News and Courier, but only if the correspondent agreed to continue his coverage of straight news as well.

In 1959, a new breed of southern white conservative began to take control of the tiny, moribund Republican Party in South Carolina. They were primarily economic conservatives like Roger Milliken of Spartanburg and Greg Shorey of Greenville,
industrialists who had moved to South Carolina to make their fortunes in manufacturing. Fiercely antigovernment, they opposed new taxes, government regulation, labor unions, and anything that appeared to support the so-called welfare state. Taking their political cues from William F. Buckley’s *National Review*, they despised the Eisenhower White House and the liberal wing of the GOP led by New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. They supported Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona in his battle for the soul of the Republican Party.

Workman’s column gave him an outlet to express his support for the conservative Republicans, but the state party appeared to pose little threat to the Democrats. By 1960, white voters in the South had grown comfortable supporting Republicans at the presidential level, but the party had little success in state elections. South Carolina Republican leaders like Milliken and Shorey supported segregation and states’ rights in 1960, but, as economic conservatives, they talked more about government intrusion into private business than federal enforcement of civil rights laws. The Republican Party could not compete with South Carolina Democrats on the issue of segregation, but Workman helped to change that. His book, *The Case for the South*, defended the racial status quo and made him a leading voice for white segregationists. His 1962 Senate campaign would unite racial and economic conservatives to create a competitive Republican Party in South Carolina, but only after three years of political activism behind the scenes. While his support for segregation was well known, Workman and his newspaper concealed his political participation while he worked as a political reporter and a columnist.

**Crossing the Line into Political Activism**

In late February 1960, state GOP official W. W. “Duck” Wannamaker, Jr., saw Workman outside the governor’s office in Columbia and told him that Goldwater had agreed to serve as keynote speaker at the South Carolina Republican Party’s state convention in March. Workman, however, was not interested in breaking the news. He agreed instead to help the Republicans maximize publicity for the senator’s appearance. Workman advised Wannamaker to wait until two weeks before the convention and send the release to the state Associated Press bureau on a Saturday so that the story would appear in Sunday newspapers across the state. Wannamaker later showed Workman a draft of the release and asked the journalist if he would “polish it up and put it in good newspaper form.” Workman wanted a number of changes. “Start off with Goldwater as the attention-getter,” Workman said. He proposed a first sentence: “U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, outspoken leader of conservative elements in the Republican Party, will address the State Republican Convention in Columbia on March 26.” Workman recommended including a direct quotation from Greg Shorey “plugging Goldwater and the coincidence of his views with most southerners.” He also suggested pointing out that Goldwater “is another in a number of prominent Republicans who have appeared” in South Carolina since Shorey took over as party chairman. Wannamaker wrote back the next day thanking the journalist...
and telling him that his ideas “are excellent and we shall certainly follow your advice.”

Workman was not the only *News and Courier* journalist communicating behind the scenes with state Republicans in early 1960. Roger Milliken, the textile magnate who helped finance the state GOP, gave Waring confidential information about plans for South Carolina Republicans to embarrass the party’s presumptive presidential nominee, Vice President Richard Nixon, by nominating Goldwater for president at their state convention in March. Waring passed along the news to Workman, but warned him that even some top GOP figures in the state were unaware of the scheme. The idea, Waring wrote, is to alert “GOP bigwigs and Nixon personally to conservative sentiment in these parts.” Once again, Workman had a political scoop, but he and his colleagues at the *News and Courier* made no effort to break the story before the convention. Workman and Waring were apparently more interested in fomenting the Goldwater insurgency than reporting on it.

On the day of Goldwater’s appearance at the GOP state convention, the *News and Courier* and the *Greenville News* published Workman’s review of Goldwater’s book, *The Conscience of a Conservative*. He called the senator “one of the most forthright citizens to appear on the national scene in many a year.” Later that day, Goldwater thrilled the state’s Republican convention delegates in Columbia with an attack on Democrats who were leading the nation “on the road to socialism.” As planned, the GOP delegates nominated their conservative hero for the Republican presidential nomination by acclamation, thus launching Goldwater’s long-shot bid to derail the Nixon nomination and put the newly energized conservative wing in charge of the national Republican Party.

**The 1960 Presidential Campaign**

Workman served as both political reporter and opinion columnist throughout the 1960 presidential campaign. In July, Workman the reporter covered the debate over a civil rights plank approved at the Democratic national convention in Los Angeles. He described southern Democrats who were “sputtering and gagging over a bitter dose of civil rights medicine” embodied in the party’s platform. Disappointed with the nomination of Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts over the southern candidate, Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas, Workman predicted the Democrats would struggle to win votes in the South. In one news story, he said “southern independents” were waiting to see whom the GOP nominated before deciding where to place their support.

Workman the columnist wanted those independents to come together behind a reliably conservative candidate. His first choice would be Goldwater, but he knew the senator had no chance of wresting the nomination from Nixon, despite an all-out push by the South Carolina Republicans. On the eve of the convention, when Nixon reached out to appease the liberal Rockefeller in the so-called “Compact of Fifth Avenue,” the South Carolina Republicans girded for war. With national television
cameras rolling, state GOP chairman Greg Shorey stepped up to the convention podium and delivered a passionate plea on behalf of Goldwater. Nixon won the nomination, but Goldwater’s insurgency at the 1960 convention gave the nation its first up-close look at the new and surprisingly strong conservative wing of the Republican Party, a movement fueled by southern activists like Shorey, Milliken, and Wannamaker of South Carolina.68

Faced with a choice between Kennedy and Nixon, a disappointed Workman used his column to bemoan the lack of a stronger conservative candidate. “The sleeping giant of American politics is a bumbling fellow named ‘conservative’ whose strength is held in check by Lilliputian liberals,” Workman wrote. “He is a stout fellow, this ‘conservative,’ yet placid. He dislikes much of what he sees about him . . . but he cannot guide his mind and his muscles in corrective action.” Workman wanted conservatives from both parties to band together to find a new political home. Northern liberals controlled the Democratic Party, he said, and they were actively seeking black support. Despite Goldwater’s push, the Republicans remained the moderate and so-called “modern” GOP of Eisenhower’s presidency. Until conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans united in one party, Workman said, they would remain politically weak.69 Greg Shorey read the column with pleasure. “I can’t tell you how grateful I am for the splendid article,” he wrote to Workman. “This is a significant contribution to not only our efforts but to a better understanding by the electorate of what we are trying to accomplish.”70

Kennedy won South Carolina with just 51.2% of the vote. His South Carolina campaign resorted to openly racist appeals. State Democrats accused Nixon of supporting integration, socializing with black celebrities, and being a member of the NAACP. They distributed pictures of federal troops enforcing integration in Arkansas in 1957. The headline read, “Remember Little Rock.”71 Nonetheless, black voters in South Carolina supported Kennedy and the Democrats in overwhelming numbers, a fact not lost on the conservative Republicans. Shortly after the election, Roger Milliken sent Waring a letter with details of black voting patterns across the state. Waring thanked the GOP activist and assured him he would look into the story. “Loss of the state was surely not due to any failures on your part,” the editor wrote to Milliken. “I enjoyed working with you and look forward to many more opportunities to strike a blow for freedom. We have plenty to do.”72

Waring forwarded Milliken’s letter and voting analysis to Workman and asked, “Think this can be interpreted and possibly reproduced?”73 The same day, Workman wrote a letter to John H. McCray, the former publisher of an aggressive black newspaper and still one of the state’s top black political activists. Workman asked about the large Democratic vote in three black precincts in Columbia and Darlington. “Do you think this reflects the general pattern of Negro voting throughout the state?” Workman inquired.74 No record of McCray’s response exists. Two weeks later, Workman’s analysis appeared as a front-page news story in the News and Courier and the Greenville News. “The pro-Democratic vote of South Carolina Negroes was a major, perhaps deciding factor,” he wrote, in winning the extremely close race for the Democratic
Party. By reaching out to allies working with the News and Courier, Milliken had propelled the story of black-voter support for the Democrats to the front pages of the state’s newspapers. The message was clear: if new black voters had found a home in the Democratic Party, then it must not be the place for southern white conservatives.

Seeing Opportunities

Workman’s Senate campaign grew out of a surprise Republican victory in South Carolina in August 1961. A well-known Columbia businessman named Charles Boineau, who had joined the party the year before, ran for an open state House seat in a special election in Richland County. The race drew a small turnout, and Boineau won a narrow victory. He became the first Republican elected to the South Carolina House since the 1890s.

Buoyed by Boineau’s victory, state Republicans set their sights on the U.S. Senate seat held by Olin D. Johnston, a former textile worker who had held public office since the Depression. The man who ran Boineau’s improbable campaign, Republican activist J. Drake Edens, hatched a plan to draft Workman into the 1962 race against Johnston. He organized a committee of Richland County Republicans who called publicly for Workman to run for the GOP nomination. Workman claimed he had no formal ties to the Republican Party and no involvement with the draft effort. Workman told Edens, however, that if the Republicans nominated him, he would accept the bid and enter the race. The statement was, in effect, an admission that he hoped to enter electoral politics. For the next three months, however, Workman continued to serve as a news reporter and opinion columnist, while his allies in the GOP ran a de facto campaign for the Senate nomination. The question of the journalistic ethics of such a dual role received no mention in the state’s largest newspapers.

Readers of the News and Courier could notice Workman’s multiple roles. They could pick up the newspaper on November 14, 1961, and see his byline over a column on the editorial page that discussed the new “respectability” of the Republican Party in South Carolina. Deeper in that day’s newspaper they would find Workman’s byline over a hard news piece on the arguments in a state Supreme Court case involving civil rights demonstrators. The next day, readers would see a brief story from the Associated Press about Edens’s effort to draft Workman into the Senate race. Headlined “GOP in Richland County Backs Workman,” the story identified the journalist as simply a “political columnist” and did not mention his position at the News and Courier. Workman the straight-news reporter appeared again on November 23 with a story on a statehouse hearing about stevedore rates at the Port of Charleston. A week later, Workman the columnist had a piece on the editorial page posing the question, why is Goldwater so popular? “To this reporter,” Workman wrote, “the answer seems to be that Goldwater sticks forthrightly to a relatively simple set of government principles.” Finally, on December 2, a front-page story from the Associated Press announced that Workman was officially entering the race for the GOP Senate nomination.
At his campaign’s kickoff rally, Workman addressed the ethical questions of what he called “his evolution” from journalist to candidate. Until recently, he said, “my field” had been journalism, and he considered it “highly improper (and) unethical for an individual to seek to combine objective reporting with partisan politics.” When Edens proposed the draft movement, Workman said he agreed to push ahead and “see what happens.” Workman also said that he wanted to retain his freedom “to go about my business—let me continue in my newspapering.” For the past three months, Workman told the crowd, he had been a “passive” candidate and thus could still operate as an impartial and independent journalist. When it became clear that he would have to campaign to win the nomination, Workman said, he decided to end his “passive campaign” and formally enter the race.

At that first rally, Workman could not help bragging to his partisan audience that his “passive” campaign had actually been a lot more active than advertised. He had delivered eighteen speeches to more than twenty-five hundred people in the past two months, he said, “and if it gets any more passive I can’t stand it.” Workman had been employed in a professional environment at the News and Courier where top editors had always been engaged in political activism. By the 1950s, however, the newspaper saw the need to acknowledge expectations of unbiased reporting and journalistic independence. But Workman failed to discuss openly the contradiction of encouraging the efforts of a campaign draft movement while being a news reporter.

Workman had been a journalist in South Carolina since 1936 and a political correspondent in the capital city for sixteen years. He had close ties with the state’s daily newspapers, and none raised ethical concerns about his dual role as journalist and politician. In fact, the press seemed disappointed that he would no longer be reporting from Columbia. The day after Workman launched his campaign, the Greenville News ran an editorial under the headline “An Able Correspondent Resigns.” The piece read more like a salute to a retiring employee than an editorial confronting tricky questions of journalism and politics. “Bill Workman is his own man,” the editorial said. “He is making sure that he will neither embarrass his former newspaper employers nor be embarrassed by them during the campaign. In his usual forthright fashion, he resigned rather than ask for a leave of absence.” The newspaper’s editors said they would continue running Workman’s political columns, which “of course will deal with regional, national and international matters,” not state politics.

The News and Courier also announced plans to continue running Workman’s column and defended the decision with a pointed example: “Ample precedent exists for people actively engaged in politics to write newspaper columns,” the paper said. “For example, Sen. Barry Goldwater, who actually holds office, syndicates a column to newspapers.” Workman’s columns immediately following his campaign announcement did not deal directly with South Carolina politics. They focused instead on the cold war and criticism of the Kennedy administration.

With Edens at the helm, Workman ran a vigorous campaign and helped boost the GOP in South Carolina by establishing volunteer organizations in every county in the state. In Sumter, Workman played up his journalistic background, especially his
reputation as a dogged news reporter: “Some of you know me as a columnist you may—or may not—read three times a week. But many know me without coat and tie—as a shirt-sleeved, shoe-leather reporter, with pencil in hand and question on tongue, inquiring into the problems of the people of South Carolina.”

By October, the polls showed the Senate race surprisingly tight, and the national media took interest. James Reston of the *New York Times* came to South Carolina to investigate the rising Republican phenomenon in the South. He called Workman a “journalistic Goldwater Republican,” and he described an editorial that Waring had published in the *News and Courier*: “His theme is a vote for [Democrat Olin] Johnston is a vote of confidence for the Kennedys . . . while a vote against Johnston is a vote against ‘the Kennedy master-state.’” Reston said he had been hearing the same refrain across the state from Democrats as well as Republicans. The political reporter had spotted a trend that was well under way in South Carolina and across the Deep South. The “great white switch” had begun. Southern conservatives were finding a new political home in the Goldwater wing of the Republican Party. Over the next three decades, the GOP would develop into the dominant political force in the Deep South.

**Conclusion**

Workman understood that his newspaper job existed at the intersection of journalism and politics. As a young man, he decided to pursue newspaper work because he eventually wanted to be “involved in government and politics in some way.” By the late 1950s, Workman realized the role of journalist—even opinion journalist—would not satisfy his desire to engage fully in the public sphere. At the same time, he knew that the standards of his profession prevented him from informing his readers of his political activism. So for the three years before he announced his Senate campaign, Workman left his readers in the dark. He presented his news reports and his columns as the detached and independent observations of a journalist trying to get at the truth. In reality, they were the work of a partisan deeply engaged in the battle between the two major political parties.

In public, Workman and Waring seemed to embrace the “monitorial” role of modern American journalism. Under this model, journalists serve as unbiased seekers of truth who use their constitutionally protected positions to serve the democratic process by providing impartial and trustworthy political information to the public. They are allowed some leeway to interpret events but are supposed to draw the line at advocacy; otherwise, they could be accused of having a conflict of interest. Across the twentieth century, mainstream American journalists embraced such standards but sometimes failed to follow them in practice. Workman and Waring, who had been mentored by a powerful editor who believed he had an obligation to engage in advocacy, adopted the contemporary standards of impartiality. Yet their personal commitment to segregation, combined with white community consensus on the issue, led them to openly oppose the civil rights movement. When the conservative wing of the Republican
Party embraced states rights and emerged as a viable alternative to the Democrats in the South, Workman and Waring joined that cause, but they hid their party-building activities to avoid violating the norms of their profession. Unlike their mentor, they carried out their political activism underground, out of sight of their readers. After his election loss in 1962, Workman returned to what he described as his “life’s calling”—the newspaper business.99 The largest paper in South Carolina, The State, immediately hired him as an assistant editor, and in 1966 he became the newspaper’s executive editor, overseeing the news and editorial operations.100 His detour into electoral politics appeared to do no harm to his career as a newsman. Journalists, then and now, have found that if they can hide their partisan activism, and thus conceal their political conflicts of interest, they can maintain their good standing in the community of professional journalism.

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Notes

4. Recent examples abound: Tim Russert, George Stephanopoulos, and Pete Williams moved from political and governmental positions to work as impartial journalists on network television; Jay Carney of Time magazine and Linda Douglass of ABC News left journalism to take prominent positions in the Obama administration.
7. Based on evidence gathered from review of the Workman and Waring papers that is detailed in the body of this article.
8. Workman discussed journalism ethics when announcing his Senate candidacy. Transcript of Workman speech delivered in Georgetown, South Carolina, December 1, 1961, William D. Workman Papers: Campaigns, Senate, 1962, South Carolina Political Collections, Ernest F. Hollings Special Collections Wing of the Thomas Cooper Library, University of South Carolina (hereafter cited as WDW Papers, SCPC).


23. Schudson, “Persistence of Vision,” 146-50. For examples of codes of conduct governing editorial writers and columnists, see Conrad C. Fink, *Writing Opinion for Impact*, 2nd ed. (Ames, IA: Blackwell, 2004), 7-10. The National Conference of Editorial Writers Basic Statement of Principles stated, “The writer should be constantly alert to conflicts of interest, real or apparent, including those that may arise from financial holdings, secondary employment, holding public office, or involvement in political, civic, or other organizations.” Despite such codes, evidence that rules remained murky for opinion journalists can be found in the dispute over George Will’s involvement in debate preparation for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan in 1980. See “Comment: Where There’s a Will There’s a Way,” *Columbia Journalism Review* 22 (September/October 1983): 25. Adding to the confusion over the role of opinion journalism is the existence of advocacy journalists who wrote for such journals as *The Nation*, the *National Review*, the alternative and minority press, and other publications of opinion and advocacy.


31. For example, Workman’s news reporting on state reaction to the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling displayed clear opposition to the decision. “Byrnes ‘Shock’d’ by Court Ruling,” *Charleston News and Courier*, May 18, 1954.


34. Workman kept a picture of “Dr. Ball” on his office wall in Columbia. See William D. Workman to Thomas R. Waring, December 6, 1961, Thomas R. Waring Papers, Correspondence: William D. Workman, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina (hereafter cited as TRW Papers, SCHS).


36. As editor of *The State* from 1913 to 1923, Ball helped organize and lead the opposition to Cole Blease, the populist who served two terms as governor of South Carolina but lost his U.S. Senate bid in 1914. In addition to his editorial support, Ball helped the anti-Blease faction of the Democratic Party select candidates to oppose Blease in the primaries, and he advised those candidates on strategy. Ball was asked to run for office several times, but declined. Later, as editor of the *News and Courier*, Ball worked behind the scenes to launch an anti-FDR candidate at the 1944 Democratic National Convention. He served as an informal adviser to Strom Thurmond’s “Dixiecrat” presidential campaign in 1948. Ball often referred to his political participation in his editorials. See Stark, *Damned Upcountryman*, 61-81, 153-97; Bedingfield, “Dixiecrat Summer of 1948,” 91-114.


38. Waring started serving on Associated Press committees when he was managing editor in the late 1940s. See TRW Papers: Correspondence: Associated Press, SCHS. He was on the ASNE membership committee from 1958 through 1965. See TRW Papers: Correspondence: American Society of Newspaper Editors, SCHS. Both the AP and ASNE had codes of ethics proclaiming their commitment to impartial news coverage.


41. Waring’s letter shortly after becoming editor severely chastised his statehouse reporters for injecting opinion into their reporting. Waring to Workman, January 29, 1951, TRW Papers: Correspondence, William D. Workman, SCHS.


44. For more on the politics of the era, see V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 1-35; Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 217-38; Patricia Sullivan,

45. Waring to William D. Workman, January 19, 1951, TRW Papers, Correspondence: William D. Workman, SCHS.


47. Workman to James J. Kilpatrick, April 22, 1957, WDW Papers: Correspondence, 1957, SCPC.

48. Workman to Waring, June 9, 1958, WDW Papers: Journalism, Charleston News and Courier, 1958, SCPC.

49. Waring to Workman, September 13, 1957, TRW Papers: Correspondence, William D. Workman, SCHS.

50. Waring to Workman, June 16, 1958, TRW Papers: Correspondence: William D. Workman, SCHS.

51. The News and Courier remained Workman’s primary employer throughout the 1950s, but he also filed statehouse news reports for the Greenville (SC) News and appeared regularly as a political reporter on WIS-TV in Columbia. Waring supported Workman’s arrangement with those organizations, but he grew concerned when Workman cut a deal with the Charlotte Observer. Waring despised the Charlotte paper, which he saw as a competitor; he granted Workman a raise and approved his new opinion column as long as Workman agreed to cut his ties with the Observer. See Waring to Workman, June 16, 1958, TRW Papers: Correspondence: William D. Workman, SCHS.

52. Waring to Workman, June 16, 1958, TRW Papers: Correspondence: William D. Workman, SCHS.


56. Their hero, Barry Goldwater, opposed segregation, but he supported states’ rights and criticized federal intervention to enforce integration. Kalk, Origins of the Southern Strategy, 25-54; Perlstein, Before the Storm, 115-18.


58. Wannamker to Workman, February 20, 1960, WDW Papers: Politics, 1960, SCPC.
60. Wannamker to Workman, March 3, 1960, WDW Papers: Politics, 1960, SCPC.
64. Gifford, “‘Dixie Is No Longer in the Bag,’” 207-33. Also see Perlstein, Before the Storm, 371-406.
68. Perlstein, Before the Storm; Gifford, “‘Dixie Is No Longer in the Bag.’”
70. Shorey to Workman, July 21, 1960, WDW Papers: Correspondence, 1960, SCPC.
72. Roger Milliken to Waring, November 16, 1960, WDW Papers: Correspondence, 1960, SCPC; Waring to Milliken, November 20, 1960, WDW Papers: Correspondence, 1960, SCPC. (Copies of the exchange between Milliken and Waring are contained in the Workman Papers.)
73. Waring to Workman, November 20, 1960, WDW Papers: Correspondence, 1960, SCPC.
74. Workman to McCray, November 20, 1960, WDW Papers: Campaigns, 1962, SCPC.
76. Charles Evans Boineau, Jr., Papers: Biographical Note, SCPC.
77. Boineau’s election was something of a fluke; he failed to win reelection in the regularly scheduled election a year later, and he never again held elective office.
80. Based on author’s review of major newspapers in South Carolina: The State, Columbia Record, News and Courier, and Greenville News.
83. Associated Press, “GOP in Richland County Back Workman.”
87. Transcript of Workman speech delivered in Georgetown, South Carolina, December 1, 1961, WDW Papers: Campaigns, Senate, 1962, SCPC.
88. Transcript of Workman speech delivered in Georgetown, South Carolina, December 1, 1961, WDW Papers: Campaigns, Senate, 1962, SCPC.
92. Memorandum by J. Drake Edens, July 1962, WDW Papers: Campaigns, Senate, 1962, SCPC.
94. Reston, “How They Fight Elections.”
95. Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4. The authors identify two “great white switches”—the increase in the white southern vote for Republicans in presidential elections, which occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s, and the change in white southern political party identification, which came in the 1980s.
97. William D. Workman, Jr., personal essay, WDW Papers, Personal: 1936, SCPC.
98. Christians et al., Normative Theories of the Media, 125.
100. William D. Workman Biographical Notes, SCPC; Workman retired from The State in 1979.